EU Intelligence Report –CBRN Elements Trade Throughout Europe
According to a report in the Guardian last week,[1] a recent 55-page internal EU “early warning” intelligence assessment concludes that various states like Syria, Iran, and North Korea (DPRK) may be orchestrating elaborate networks of institutions, diplomatic missions, and front companies which allegedly buy or steal critical parts for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Although the accuracy of the reporting remains under question,[2] CBRN rackets of the kind would not be a new revelation, but would likely prove indicative of an altogether broader manifestation of the illicit trade in prohibited dual-use parts and information. The most staggering revelation of the CBRN trade came when Dr. A.Q. Khan, considered the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, was found to have engineered a wide-ranging transnational business in the sale of designs and dual-use parts to so-called “rogue regimes.”
Although European courts would likely claim jurisdiction for the prosecution of any individual or business accused of participating in the CBRN trade, American law does provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction.[3] Note, this is not to say that American courts claim universal jurisdiction –as may be in the case within the areas of torture, genocide, or crimes against humanity –whereby any person may be tried for the crime regardless of any nexus with American citizens or territory. But in an ever globalizing world where wire transfers ping through banks in New York within seconds and American citizens may be involved in any number of corporate positions abroad, the prospect of even the most inadvertent nexus with American persons, interests, or territory is considerable.
18 U.S.C. §832 expressly prohibits the willful participation in or knowingly providing of material support or resources to a WMD program of a “foreign terrorist power” (which includes both terrorist organizations and state-sponsors of terrorism like Syria, Iran, and DPRK). Those convicted under this statute face up to 20 years in prison for each count. Given the recent push to identify and obstruct CBRN production efforts worldwide by the American government, it is by no means inconceivable that purely foreign corporate executives and businesses could find themselves indicted for such activity even if conducted exclusively abroad.
Although European courts would likely claim jurisdiction for the prosecution of any individual or business accused of participating in the CBRN trade, American law does provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction.[3] Note, this is not to say that American courts claim universal jurisdiction –as may be in the case within the areas of torture, genocide, or crimes against humanity –whereby any person may be tried for the crime regardless of any nexus with American citizens or territory. But in an ever globalizing world where wire transfers ping through banks in New York within seconds and American citizens may be involved in any number of corporate positions abroad, the prospect of even the most inadvertent nexus with American persons, interests, or territory is considerable.
18 U.S.C. §832 expressly prohibits the willful participation in or knowingly providing of material support or resources to a WMD program of a “foreign terrorist power” (which includes both terrorist organizations and state-sponsors of terrorism like Syria, Iran, and DPRK). Those convicted under this statute face up to 20 years in prison for each count. Given the recent push to identify and obstruct CBRN production efforts worldwide by the American government, it is by no means inconceivable that purely foreign corporate executives and businesses could find themselves indicted for such activity even if conducted exclusively abroad.
[1] Ian Traynor and Ian Cobain, Intelligence Report Claims Nuclear Market Thriving: European Firms Warned They Are Main Target of Illicit Trade in Weapons Parts, The Guardian, Wednesday, January 4, 2005. Found here.
[2] See Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “WMD Procurement Networks in Europe,” Arms Control Wonk blog, January 4, 2006. Found here.
[3] See, for example, 18 U.S.C. §832(b)
posted by McNabb Associates, P.C. @ 11:17 AM
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